The Ruxted Group

Sovereignty Requires More Than Lip Service

Canada’s Arctic has been in the news again. It has been suggested that climate change will reduce the range of threats to our sovereignty over Arctic waters because they (Canadian waters, per se) are less likely to be highly desirable transit routes, thus lowering the relative importance of e.g. Arctic/Offshore Patrol Vessels. At the same time, through a new National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, the USA is reasserting its claims of right of free passage in the Northwest Passage, making the need for a real Canadian presence more important.

Disputes between Canada and the USA are nothing new but they all have one thing in common: they are, inevitably – over the past century or so – resolved by negotiation.

But our sovereignty is not ‘threatened’ by just the USA.

Further, ‘sovereignty’ can no longer be confined to rigid zones. What a neighbour does or fails to do in its ‘sovereign’ territory and contiguous waters can have grave impacts on Canadians going about their lawful business in our sovereign territory – a ruptured oil well in Russia’s Arctic waters, for example, can (almost certainly will) pollute Canadian waters. Human smugglers in international waters may pose a real, immediate threat to Canada. Arbitrary lines on maps cannot be allowed to threaten our sovereign rights to manage our own affairs and resources in our own territory.

In many cases Canada can negotiate with those who ‘threaten’ our sovereignty. In some cases negotiation will fail.

Our sovereignty must be both asserted and protected. Asserting and protecting our sovereignty is a job for the whole of the Government of Canada, including DND. Diplomats, lawyers and various uniformed services (like the Coast Guard and the RCMP, as well as the Canadian Forces) are in the ‘front lines’ when it comes to asserting and defending our sovereignty.

The Department of National Defence is just that: the agency charged with defending the nation. The defence of Canada starts at those arbitrary lines but may well extend beyond that. The lines on maps define our ‘area of responsibility’ – the area in which Canada, without question, may assert its sovereign rights – even as they are being challenged in various international fora. But we also have ‘areas of influence’ where we may make our presence felt and ‘areas of interest’ where we will want and need to ‘see’ what is going on.

When we are in our ‘area of responsibility’ it is, broadly, most appropriate that regulatory and constabulary organizations (e.g. Coast Guard and RCMP) lead in the assertion and protection of our sovereignty – backed up and supported by the Canadian Forces. When we are in our ‘areas of influence’ and ‘areas of interest’ then agencies like Foreign Affairs (DFAIT) and DND will need to be in the lead because they have international recognition of their international roles and responsibilities.

Canada needs to be able to meet its sovereignty protection roles in all our areas of responsibility, influence and interest. That means we need strong, capable diplomatic services and equally strong and capable uniformed services, like the Coast Guard and RCMP, able to operate on the ground, in the air and at sea in and all the way around Canada. The Canadian Forces needs to able to support other agencies in Canada and play a leading role elsewhere to fulfil their role of monitoring, identifying and, ultimately, preventing unauthorized penetration of our territory, contiguous waters and the airspace over both.

To do this, the CF needs:

1.   A capable intelligence gathering apparatus to monitor things happening in our areas of interest, influence and responsibility;

2.   A real time surveillance and warning system that covers all our territory and the ‘approaches’ to it, all the time;

3.   Ships, units and aircraft to patrol our territory and the approaches to it and to intercept, identify and deal with intruders of any and all types.

Parts of these requirements exist but none is complete.

The costs of ships, satellites, aircraft, ground stations and people are high but unavoidable if we want to maintain our sovereignty over and above the land and sea we claim, today, as our own.

Now, in a financial crisis, is not the time for false economies or lip service. Short term financial ‘gains’ achieved by reducing defence spending in 2009 could saddle Canada with some real long term ‘pain’ in the years and decades beyond 2010. 

The Defence Budget

It is no secret that Canada is in the throes of a financial crisis.

Governments’ normal reaction is times of crisis is to cut, or at least contain, defence spending to free up money for other more popular projects and programmes.

2009 is not a normal year; The Lady’s Not for Burning or turning and Canadians need to apply the same resolve to their national defence: despite the sorry state of our economy we must not turn back the clock to the 1990s - the defence budget is not for cutting.

2009 is not a normal year because we have Canadian Forces members – our friends and family, the neighbours’ boys, our colleagues’ daughters – at war; they are not just in a combat zone, they are in close contact with the enemy in Afghanistan. We are paying a price – in lives and in shattered minds and bodies – to give effect to the Canadian promoted doctrine of “Responsibility to Protect.” Less important than the lost lives and broken bodies, but costly all the same, is the price of fuel and ammunition and the equipment which are being consumed in combat. After several “decades of darkness” 2009 is not a year to falter. Canadians finally appeared ready, in 2007/2008, to begin the long, painful and expensive process of rebuilding our military muscle so that Canada could, after a 40 year hiatus, ”make a real difference in halting and preventing conflict and improving human welfare around the world,” because, as former Prime Minister Martin said (same source), Canada must practice the kind of “activism that over decades has forged our nation’s international character—and will serve us even better in today’s changing world. The people of our country have long understood that, as a proud citizen of the world, Canada has global responsibilities. We can’t solve every problem, but we will do what we can to protect others, to raise them up, to make them safe.”

2009 is not the year to abandon our global responsibilities. Grave as our economic problems may be they pale in comparison to the economic, military, social and medical problems that bedevil the ”Bottom Billion.” Canadians hope that we can help the “Bottom Billion” without entering another shooting war but events in those countries, which are in a geo-political arc stretching from Afghanistan through to Zimbabwe, suggest that we, Canadians and other rich, sophisticated, militarily capable and mostly Western nations will have to use force to bring help and hope to the poorest of the poor and weakest of the weak.

2009 is a year in which Canada’s defence budget needs to grow, in real terms, even as the nation’s top bank economists are advising Finance Minister Flaherty to, later rather than right now, reign in government programme spending.

DND can and will look for ways to stretch every dollar it has – if DND has learned nothing else since the 1960s, it has learned how to pinch pennies; in fact, it has often been accused of being penny-wise and pound-foolish. Some defence spending – on DND’s badly neglected infrastructure on bases and stations in Canada or on replacing Canadian made equipment that has been worn out or damaged in combat – can be used to stimulate the economy in 2009. Mindless cuts to defence spending will not help Canadians in 2009 or beyond, only contributing more to our financial woes.

Finance Minister Flaherty will bring down a budget later in this month. The Ruxted Group urges him to increase defence spending, in real terms. A larger defence budget is good policy and it can be made into good politics as well.

Prognostications: 2009 – M to Z

Military Service – in Canada the public’s perception military service has, broadly, alternated between a few brief periods of near adulation and the more common long periods of public indifference verging on disdain. Neither is particularly useful.

The rare periods of public adoration were, essentially, bouts of self congratulation and they gave birth to or reinforced a myth that, in some inexplicable manner, the defence of Canada was best left in the hand of ordinary or average Canadians who would, when a crisis occurred, rally to the colours and save the day.

The long periods of public disinterest created or reinforced a different myth: someone else, the UK, first, lately the USA, must do the world’s policing and Canada can, indeed should, sit on the sidelines and hope that the ‘big boys’ wouldn’t do too much damage to Canada’s trading interests or expect us to take on too much.

There was one brief period (roughly 1948 to 1968) when the Government of Canada and the people of Canada actually put the military and military service into its proper perspective – as a “tool” that governments use to accomplish broader strategic aims. A succession of Liberal and Conservative governments had national goals expressed in (shared) basic policy principles that enjoyed the broad support of Canadians. Canadians, politicians and average Canadians alike, understood that in sending their small, professional military force into direct combat in Korea, into a “trip wire” role, face to face with a huge, aggressive, threatening enemy in North West Europe or on ‘peacekeeping’ duties in other regions that aimed to prevent more imminent threats they were pursuing bigger, broader, even bolder aims than those of ‘just’ military action and the military, itself, understood that it was a policy tool.

We need to return to the basics. We need to find, once again, the ”Role of Pride and Influence in the World” that we abandoned circa 1970 and, consistently, failed to assert throughout the ‘80s and ‘90s and the first decade of the 21st century. When we recover that ‘role’ then Canadians will be able to understand why they want and need an appropriately (for one of the world’s “top ten” nations) strong, flexible, professional military and why they, Canadian citizens, should take pride in its accomplishments and should want to support their military – not with yellow ribbons or red shirts but with their tax dollars and with votes for political parties that make good use of their military “tools.”

Navy Ships – our fleet needs a makeover. The three remaining destroyers need to be replaced by four area air defence and command/control ships – perhaps as the ‘lead’ of a new fleet on common surface ships. The twelve frigates need to be given a major, half-life refit, soon.  The promised half dozen or so Arctic/Off shore Patrol Vessels need to be funded, designed, built and put into service. New fleet replenishment ships need to be built or purchased. Plans need to be started to replace the four Upholder class submarines with a half dozen under-ice capable submarines. Plans need to be advanced to replace the coastal defence vessels with some combination of mine counter measures vessels and coastal patrol craft.

While all that is ongoing DND needs to hire a few thousand new sailors to make all those ships ready.

Operations – these are the raison d’être of the Canadian Forces. Not all operations are combat operations, and government needs to ensure that the Canadian Forces remain ready and able to conduct the whole range of operations from Search and Rescue and disaster relief to mass combat on a high intensity battlefield.

Press - the Canadian Government must become more conscious of its dealings with the Press and become a more active participant in putting out the word as to what Canadians and the Canadian Forces are doing to improve the lives of the people of Afghanistan.  More coverage and exposure as to what Canadian Forces and Canadian Police Agencies are doing in training and mentoring the Afghan Army and Police Forces is required.  More coverage of what the OMLT and Provincial Reconstruction Teams are doing in helping to rebuild the infrastructure of Afghan communities.  More coverage of what NGO's are doing is required.   Canadians on many levels are working to rebuild Afghanistan.  By far, the majority of their stories are not being told.

Québec – Québec’s  soldiers are just as brave, loyal and ready to serve as any others. It is time the media stopped trying to create controversy where none exists. Many, likely most other Québecers, on the other hand, continue to be “out of step” with their fellow citizens – as they are on a range of issues. This is part of the complex fabric of Canada. It makes life difficult for politicians.


Recruiting and Retention - the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group must reform itself and its message. The CF needs thousands, indeed tens of thousands of new sailors, soldiers and air force members. The ‘front line’ are the men and women in the recruiting system. They need to have the skills, tools and money make the recruiting process work effectively and efficiently and, above all, speedily – consistent with getting the right people in and keeping the wrong ones out.

Members of the CF should be encouraged to continue their careers in order to maintain continuity in all trades.  There should be several plans that could encourage this.  One incentive would be a 'signing bonus' for members to reenlist in their trade on the end of their initial engagement and basic engagement periods of employment.   Another plan would encourage CF personnel on release, to do a 'reverse component transfer' to the reserves, in order to fill much needed positions in reserves with 'experienced' personnel, and bring up the calibre of the reserve forces.  This may alleviate some of the problems faced by reserve units, when they get personnel trained to a certain standard and then loose them to the regular force through component transfers.  Another incentive would be to hire retired, injured or medically released CF personnel into the training system as contractors to provide experienced instructors to free up currently serving members to fill manning shortfalls in other establishments.

One of DND’s main aims must be to retain as many trained, experienced members as possible. While a number of factors contribute to people leaving the forces, Ruxted suggests that quality of life for both members and their families is high on the list. To mention just one of many demotivating factors, garrison life in Canada can be an emotional let down after the camaraderie and sense of purpose of an operational tour. Previous generations used to jokingly refer to getting back to real soldiering after the war is over. It, however, is a challenge to convince someone who was in real peril a few months ago that the monotony of garrison routine or the artificial pressure of a career course is reality, and not the other way around.


Sudan - Canada is involved in a range of activities in Sudan, including military activities as part of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan and the African Union Mission in Sudan.  Has enough changed since the expression of Ruxted's previous position: "To call for Canadian blood to be spilled in the sands of Darfur in an open ended mission for no result is perhaps the greatest folly our politicians, academics and journalists could commit"?  Not yet - in the words of Rick Hillier, "we are unprepared, under-resourced and lacking the public support necessary to successfully intervene in many of today's complex conflicts. Until these shortcomings are addressed, discussions on humanitarian intervention will remain purely academic."

Transformation – needs to continue. The next step is to downsize, rationalize and downsize again the current headquarters – which many observers consider too many in number and too large in size. The trick is to get it just right. There is an almost unbearable demand by government/politicians to micro-manage every little process. That’s understandable – politicians, and, especially, their unelected staffs, are highly risk averse and whenever something goes wrong happens the media are there like hungry jackals circling a wounded antelope. Who can blame them?

The next step in transformation should aim at lessening the ‘management overhead’ – at every level. Less management will generate higher morale., greater enthusiasm and increased attention to the assigned tasks. Less management will produce qualitatively better forces and save a bit of money, too.

Understanding - Although great advances have been made for serving members who report mental issues with PTSD more must be done to teach the 'system' that reporting such issues will not result in a full stop in relation to career development. We have all seen the physically wounded being nurtured back to a resumption of their careers, and this is how it should be, however the "suck it up, Buttercup" attitude in relation to mental conditions must be pushed off the map forever so that no one suffers in silence, and thereby potentially bringing harm to careers and to the loved ones who supported the member while they served.

We know much has been done, and that this issue has come a long way, but the Ruxted Group feels that we still have a long way to go.

Victory – in Afghanistan we will have the requisite “victory conditions” when, as we reported to the Manley Commission “the people of Afghanistan can make their own decisions in their own way, even when they decide on policies with which we disagree – always bearing in mind that Canada, and the world, cannot accept a country's decision to turn itself into a base for aggressive war … [and] when the Afghans can elect a government – even if it is a government which we do not much like … [and] when the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police are able to contain insurgencies – home-grown and foreign.”

We have, already, met some of those victory conditions, others are on track, now. There is hope for a sensible ‘victory’ in Afghanistan if we stay the course a bit longer.

Wounded Warriors – all, regular and reservist , deserve equal care and benefits. It is bad policy and worse PR to discriminate – as current policy does – against some (reserve) members who are wounded while serving on less than a 180 day ‘contract.’ To paraphrase: if that’s the Treasury Board policy then the Treasury Board Secretariat is composed of asses.

X-ray Vision – it’s here, now along with a whole host of other technological marvels that can and should be made right here in Canada, for the Canadian Forces. This ‘stuff’ is not rocket science – it’s actually rather more complex than that – but it can and should be developed by Canadian defence scientists, in Canadians defence laboratories, using Canadian R&D money and then given to Canadian entrepreneurs to build and sell to Canada and our allies.

Yankee Bashing – needs to stop. The United States of America is a great country, imperfect, to be sure, but “better” than pretty much any of the other great powers that have strutted and fretted their hours upon the stage over the course of the past few thousand years.

For about a century the US has been a close friend, an ally in times of war and, latterly, our most important trading partner and, despite the irritants that must arise between trading partners, a good neighbour.

Canada has policy differences with the USA. Canadians often dislike the courses our American friends and neighbours decide, in their own democratic fashion, to pursue. Friends and neighbours can disagree but there is a constant nasty edge to the Canadian side of the discourse. It is an edge that speaks poorly about Canadians and our political maturity.

There is more to Canada than simple the fact that it is not the USA. Canadians would do better to learn more about why their country is “good” than to repeat (often untrue) canards about why the USA is “bad.”

It’s time to grow up, Canada!

Zimbabwe - may be a bellweather for the “Bottom Billion.” Recent unrest and associated spin-off problems in Zimbabwe, as well as more recent rumblings elsewhere, draws the eye to poor, beleagured Africa. Poverty, governance, AIDS, resource and ethic issues continue to fuel conflicts in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, even Ethiopia/Eritrea (where a ceasefire following a 30-year-long civil war, as well as now-out-the-door United Nations mission, hasn't eased all areas of contention between the two countries), to list only the more obvious choices.  Ruxted hopes Canada's decision makers (both political and bureaucratic) remember the caveats we've laid out when considering what will likely be increasing calls to do something (especially something military) about Africa.

Prognostication: 2009

‘Tis the season for prognostication, and the Ruxted Group, after a long vacation, cannot resist.

Herewith, in alphabetical order, are a few disconnected thoughts on 2009, and beyond:
 
Afghanistan – will not go away. The 2011 ‘deadline’ for redeployment – which does not, necessarily, mean withdrawal – approaches quickly. So does a formal request from soon to be President Barack Obama’s new government. It will be impossible for the Government of Canada to not do something in that unfortunate country – if only because we must maintain friendly relations with the US and quid pro quo is still a normal process in international politics. Canadian politicians and opinion makers/leaders need to start discussing how and where, in Afghanistan, we are going to play a highly visible and valued role.

2011 is an arbitrary date and conditions – military and political, inside Afghanistan and in Ottawa - will change and the ‘decision’ may need to change with them.

By 2011 Canada ought to be able to offer about a brigade’s worth of (minimally) effective Afghan National Army units as proof that we have done a full and fair share in Kandahar. But even if we can shift our forces away from Kandahar, or perhaps just away from a combat mission in Kandahar, casualties will still be suffered.

If Canada leaves Afghanistan the Canadian Forces will, without question, end up in another combat mission somewhere else and they will kill and die there, too. See K, below.

Bullets and Beans – the military is a large and extraordinarily complex thing. Very often the public – including a too often disinterested commentariat – fails to understand that there is much, much more to the military than just the combat soldiers in the Forward Operating Bases, or just the men and women in Afghanistan, or at sea, or flying aircraft. The military also has a large infrastructure of its own – one that has, much like too many of Canada’s bridges and overpasses, been ignored and even abused over the past few “decades of darkness.” When, rather than if, the calls come for military belt tightening, DND must be ready to economize but that does not mean that the fuel tanks and spare parts bins can be emptied. Such ‘economies’ are usually false. 

Canadian Politics –  the world's situation has grown increasingly bleak in the 21st century. Terrorism has been joined by growing poverty, disease and despair – which breed more of the same. The problems of poverty, disease and despair are exacerbated by a global credit crisis and a consequential desire, in the developed world, to shut out the cries for help from what is called the “Bottom Billion”. We, in Canada, need a firm, stable government to meet the crises that are emerging, now.

Canadians are divided in their politics but, surely, not in their desire to do what is both right for the world and best for us. The Ruxted Group doubts that there is too much difference, on those fundamental issues, between most Conservatives and most Liberals. If the two parties cannot overcome their differences in approach and work together for the common good then we urge Canadians to elect one or the other to a majority.

Defence Policy – while we are happier now, after the publication of the Canada First Defence Strategy, than we were just a year ago, the five challenges we set out for the government (be brave, be honest with Canadians, offer a grand strategy, table a sound defence policy and commit enough money) remain, largely, unmet.

Economic Issues – while Ruxted welcomes the increase in spending set forth in the “Canada First Defence Strategy” it must be understood that it represents a long, slow decrease in defence capabilities unless the Government of Canada adjusts the way it funds major military operations. The money promised in “Canada First” is probably (barely) adequate if DND does not have to pay for major operations, like Afghanistan, out of its regular budget allocations. The money promised in “Canada First” is, probably, adequate to raise, equip, train and maintain an appropriate (for a G8 nation) military force but it is clearly too little to send any substantial parts of that force into sustained operations.

Federal Follies -  it is time for Canadian politicians to actually consider military requirements, rather just than local and regional political pork-barrelling, when defence projects are approved. Equally, it is time for the defence staffs (civilian and military) to consider the utility of spending 10% or even 20% of capital to get a wee tiny bit of Canadianization. Sometimes the old adage that “the best is the enemy of the good enough” is too true.

Guns and Butter – it is no secret that the Canadian economy, along with those of all the other rich, developed countries, is in recession. When times are tough Canadians, traditionally, want to tighten their belts and the government’s, too. Defence spending is, also traditionally, an early and popular target for cuts and amongst the last ‘spending envelopes’ to be refilled when times are good. Military planners and military members understand the need for prudence but brave men and women are fighting and dying as Canadians celebrate the holidays and a hopefully better New Year.

Helicopters – we are making progress (BZ to Prime Minister Harper’s government, with special thanks to former MND Gordon O’Connor who, faced with a hostile press and a divided military, pressed hard for strategic airlift and new helicopters) but there is still much to do. We need to recognize that aviation is a teeth arm along with the infantry, armour, artillery and engineers and fully ‘integrate’ both helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles into the ground combat system. As we have said before the Government of Canada needs to find and spend billions and billions of ‘new’ dollars to provide the Canadian Forces with enough aviation resources – for land and sea operations.

Infantry – Field Marshal Lord Wavell, one of the 20th centuries most thoughtful soldiers, said, in 1945, in a letter to the editor, “… all battles and all wars are won in the end by the infantryman … the infantryman always bears the brunt. His casualties are heavier, he suffers greater extremes of discomfort and fatigue than the other{s} … the art of the infantryman is less stereotyped and far harder to acquire in modern war than that of any other arm … the infantryman has to use initiative and intelligence in almost every step he moves, every action he takes on the battle-field … we ought therefore to put our men of best intelligence and endurance into the Infantry … yet the Infantry in peace or war receives the lowest rates of pay, the drabbest uniforms, sometimes even the least promising of recruits; most important of all, it ranks lowest in the public estimation and prestige. This is all wrong and should be set right by methods more important than a capital I … in all the long history of war on land the front-line fighting man, whose role is to close with the enemy and force him to flee, surrender, or be killed—the only method by which battles are ever won—has two categories only—those who fight mounted—once the Knights-at-arms, then the Cavalry, now the Armoured Corps—and those who fight on their feet—the inevitable, enduring, despised, long-suffering Infantry (with a very capital I)”. Everyone in government and in DND, too, must remember that the ‘point’ consists of sailors on ships, soldiers in their forward operating bases and aircrew in aircraft.

The rest, including the Chief of the Defence Staff and all the admirals and generals and bureaucrats and, yes, politicians, too, are ”in support” in one way or the other. And so are all the rest of us. When asked, we all pay lip service to this basic fact. Too often, however, our actions speak louder than words. When it is inconvenient to make the extra effort so that somebody at the sharp end gets new boots or a hot meal or spare parts today instead of tomorrow, the "we can't be expected to do everything" attitude applies.

Junk Science Policy – it is time to discard some ‘junk policies,’ especially those related to the slow, cumbersome, bureaucratic nightmare called defence procurement. The Government of Canada needs to be a smart, efficient, effective consumer. We need to buy the right kit in sufficient quantities when it is needed by the sailor in ships, soldiers in the field, aircrew in the air and supporting people in their dockyards, workshops and hangers and we need to buy it without unnecessary frills and at the lowest possible cost consistent with timely delivery, proper quality control and life cycle maintenance.

The Ruxted Group is convinced, based upon the experiences of other countries, that there are better policy models than ones used in Canada and the USA. Let’s get rid of the gas money guzzling behemoth of a defence procurement system – which involves too many government departments, each with competing goals and priorities, and build a sleek, nimble, cost effective one in its place – reporting to one, 100% responsible, minister, within the Department of National Defence.

Above all, DND must manage a continuing dichotomy: It must be prepared to pay a little more for a greater breadth or depth of capability (flexibility), yet it must remain vigilant against paying a premium for only marginal capability gains.

Defence procurement is a mess because the Government of Canada allowed the process (the bureaucracy) to become more important than the product (timely delivery of the right product). The mess can be fixed so that the CF gets the right equipment, on time and at a fair and reasonable price.

Kilometres Miles to go before I sleep – we have “promises to keep” (based on decades of words without deeds in the ‘70s, ‘80s and ‘90s) to Afghanistan and the world. Canada led the charge for the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) Doctrine in the UN. More and more and more peoples, concentrated in the “Bottom Billion” need, indeed are begging for our protection – will we exercise our self proclaimed ‘responsibility’ to offer effective help or will we just convene yet another meeting of overfed politicians, bureaucrats, ‘activists’ and celebrities in another five star resort? Effective, responsible help is going to require a robust military (combat) capability – force which can be projected and maintained far, far from Canada in some of the most difficult and dangerous places on earth.

Limited Resources to Meet Limitless Requirements – the calls for help, and the promises we need to keep appear limitless, and in practical terms that is the case.

“Canada,” many of us will cry – repeating Pierre Trudeau’s lie in the 1970 White paper A Foreign Policy for Canadians – “is a small, poor country with too many problems of its own. We have huge problems of our own and we cannot be expected to bail out everyone else.” The Ruxted Group repeats: that’s a lie. It was poppycock in 1970 and it is still poppycock now. Canada is, by any fair and sensible measure, one of the ‘top’ (richest) dozen or so nations in the world. Our GDP (nearly $1.5 Trillion) is nearly double than of the bottom 100 countries recognized by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. We are beyond just rich. We are stable, democratic, sophisticated, law abiding and so on – all the things the ‘Bottom Billion” want to become. If we cannot help then we cannot, possibly, call on others to do the heavy lifting. If we cannot help it will be because –and only because – we chose not to help, because we chose to close our eyes and our minds and our hearts to the plight of others, because we are a small, greedy people. Yes, there is an economic crisis; yes, we have serious domestic social problems; yes, we are far from being the richest or most powerful country in the world and yes, we can help.

M to Z will follow soon in a few days.

Lawrence Martin is Out to Lunch

In a recent Globe and Mail column Lawrence Martin, with whom The Ruxted Group has disagreed in the past, once again demonstrates his abysmal ignorance of matters military.  This time it is on several levels.

First is the matter of civilian control. Martin says: “...in view of his [Hillier’s] unwillingness to tolerate the tradition of civilian control, Mr. Harper was not prepared to make that offer [of a two or three year extension to his tour of duty as CDS].” That is arrant nonsense of the highest order. Martin, quite clearly, does not know what civilian control of the military is all about. He is, demonstrably, an ignorant man.

Civilian control of the military is simple: anyone, even the Chief of the Defence Staff, may propose military operations but only the government of the day and parliament may dispose – authorize and fund them. It’s really that simple. There is nothing, not a credible word, anywhere, to suggest that Gen. Hillier did anything but loyally and professionally spend his entire career supporting effective civilian control of the military. To suggest otherwise, as Martin does, is a mean spirited sneak attack by a weakling. He and The Globe and Mail should be ashamed.

But, apparently intent on demolishing his own thesis, Martin suggests that, somehow or other, Prime Minister Harper fired Gen. Hillier by not demanding that the CDS stay in place for two or three more years – that, firing the CDS, must be the ultimate in civilian control. There is no evidence to support such a suggestion. Gen. Hillier and Prime Minister Harper have both stated, categorically, that it was Gen. Hillier’s own good choice to retire in the coming summer – for Gen. Hillier’s own good and valid reasons that include a need for change at the top. But Martin is not daunted by lack of evidence. He hints and insinuates but, at the end offers nothing but his own highly biased bad guess.

The next level of error involves Martin’s baseless assertion that Afghanistan is “Hillier’s war.” More rubbish. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, the NDP Defence Critic or even members of the commentariat like Lawrence Martin may propose that, for example, we should send our forces to Darfur or Haiti – just as Rick Hillier is reported to have proposed that we send Canadians to Kandahar. But, as we pointed out , it strains credulity – even Lawrence Martin’s biased credulity, we suggest – to believe that Gen. Hillier did or Lawrence Martin could convince a room full of some of the smartest, most skilled politicians and bureaucrats in Ottawa to conduct military operations they opposed. For heaven’s sake, Gen. Hillier was not even CDS when Prime Minister Jean Chrétien first sent Canadians into combat in Kandahar; how on earth can anyone, even someone as biased as Lawrence Martin, call it “Hillier’s War”?

Gen. Hillier certainly did propose a lot to Bill Graham and Paul Martin and then to Gordon O’Connor, Peter MacKay and Stephen Harper: he proposed a transformation of attitudes and action within official Ottawa and he proposed a change in attitude, towards the military, to Canadians at large. But not even Lawrence Martin can suggest that anyone but Paul Martin and Stephen Harper and their ministers and members of both the Conservative and Liberal parties approved anything. Civilians controlled – as they must and always do.

The third level of error involves the idea, if that’s the right word, that senior military commanders must see a war through to its end. Apparently Lawrence Martin is also abysmally ignorant of Canadian history; evidently the names Anderson, Stuart and Murchie mean nothing to him. They were Chiefs of the General Staff during various parts of the Second World War. Staying on and on and on until a war is won, or lost, is not part of our history anywhere in the West. Martin is making things up.

Lawrence Martin is clearly and completely wrong and wrong again and again and again. It is a pity that a newspaper as well known as the Globe and Mail allows an otherwise skilled political analyst to spout such unadulterated rubbish in its pages. Martin is out to lunch – and, for the sake of the Globe and Mail’s reputation, he ought to stay there.

Therein Lies The Problem

"Canada's strengths are not in its military force,'' he [Mohamed Boudjenane of the Canadian Arab Federation and NDP member of the Ontario legislature for Etobicoke North.] said. "Let's not (kid) ourselves -- we're not a power.”
Source: CTV New at http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20080314/afghan_protests_080314/20080314?hub=TopStories

And therein lies the problem: Mr. Boudjenane is right, Canada is not a power, not a superpower, not a great power, and, in reality, not even a middle power.

In 1969 Canada decided, consciously, to eschew ‘hard power,’ Canada chose to be weak and disengaged. Prime Ministers Mulroney and Chrétien began, hesitantly, to change that in the 1990s when they authorized Canadian Forces participation in a variety of UN and, later, UN-mandated NATO missions in the Balkans. But both prime ministers, ever the Canadian pragmatists, were interested in doing just enough to show that Canada was ‘doing its bit’ to stabilize the international security problems brought to the fore in the new world order, thus safeguarding Canada’s trade and commerce interests – especially vis à vis the USA.

Canada was a power – up until 1969. Canada was a middle power but, to be sure, a cash-strapped one. Canada had emerged from the ashes of the 2nd World War as something pretty close to a major power – but that condition could never last and should never have lasted. The Marshall Plan and the Colombo Plan (in which Canada was a major player and which fostered the rise of India) were designed, in part, to bring about their own new world order – one in which former, war ravaged great powers would be rebuilt and rearmed so that they could bear a full and fair share of the global collective security burden envisioned by the United Nations’ charter. It didn’t quite work out that way – even with substantial North American aid (and charity) Britain, France, Germany and Japan could only become pale shadows of the great powers they had been. One of the reasons the former great powers failed to regain their past stature and, equally, why Canada found maintaining a leadership position amongst the middle and lesser powers was money.

By the mid to late 1950s the costs of defence hardware and of the (fewer in number but more expensive in skills) military personnel needed to operate and maintain it had skyrocketed and they continued to grow at far above general rate of inflation throughout the succeeding decades, as they do today. All countries, including the USA, found defence expenditures hard to manage; Canada was no exception.

The entirety of the Avro Arrow imbroglio was financial: building and flying the Arrow would have destroyed the Canadian Forces unless unconscionably huge increases were made to the defence budget – in the teeth of a recession! Defence Minister Paul Hellyer’s organizational ‘experiments’ in the early 1960s (the integration and unification of the Canadian Forces) were designed, almost exclusively to try to contain the ever growing costs of defending Canada. Those problems have only gotten more difficult to solve as the decades passed.

By the end of the ‘60s Canada was awash in anti-war and anti-military sentiments – greater by far than the mistrust of large military establishments that is part and parcel of our British heritage. In the 1970s inflation soared and the already high inflation rates associated with ever more technologically advanced military hardware went from high to nearly impossible but, in Canada, defence budgets were frozen. In the ‘80s it was becoming clear to most of the allies that the way to win the Cold War was to just keep American defence spending – especially on technology – growing; the Russians, it was reasoned would “have to eat grass” to keep up, or surrender. In the face of this, Canada, under Prime Minister Trudeau, embarked on a ‘peace initiative’ that was intellectually unsound and did measurable damage to our relations with our best friends and closest allies.

Briefly, in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, it looked as though Pierre Trudeau might have been right. History might have ended and nationalistic military forces might have become useless. Sadly the idea of a peaceful new world order demonstrated, yet again, the triumph of hope over experience. History was not ended; rather, as Francis Fukuyama forecasted, the end of the Cold War and, implicitly the end of the capitalism vs. (Marxist) communism debate, did ”not by any means imply the end of international conflict per se ...” there will ”still be a high and perhaps rising level of ethnic and nationalist violence, since those are impulses incompletely played out ...” and ”terrorism and wars of national liberation will continue to be an important item on the international agenda.” ¹

But, in 1970, Canada launched a process of unilateral disarmament and of disengagement from the collective security regime that had underpinned Western security for twenty years; by 1995 it was very, very hard to reverse the process.

Canada is, currently, punching above its weight. Since the mid to late 1990s we have, almost consistently, maintained a substantial naval presence in areas of dangerous tensions and a small but tough, well trained and adequately equipped army force in (mostly) combat operations and we have also, occasionally, provided modern combat aircraft for combat operations. This has made Canadians and some of our allies forget (temporarily, at least) that we spent a quarter century, as John Manley put it, like the man who enjoys a good dinner with his friends but, when the bill is presented, runs off to hide in the washroom while the other pay his share. It has also stretched our military resources right to the breaking point.

We could do nothing else because, as Mohamed Boudjenane of the Canadian Arab Federation noted, “we’re not a power.”

For a decade we have tried to act like a power – but, for the most part, without paying the price.

It seems pretty clear that Canadians believe they have a useful, productive, even important role to play in the world. Canadians have views and ideas and aspirations and they want their government and its agents to assert itself on the world’s stage to adopt, for Canada and Canadians, in former Prime Minister Paul Martin’s words, “A role of pride and influence in the world.”²

In that title former Prime Minister Martin correctly identified both sides of the coin: Canadians want to play a constructive role of their own (not as an adjunct to the USA) in world affairs and they want to take pride and satisfaction in that role. There is just one problem: over and over again Canadians tell their government that they don’t want to spend any money on these noble aims.

There are three main aspects to any reasonable sort of “role of pride and influence in the world”:

1. Diplomacy – Canada needs to be active in the world, in the United Nations, in other international political, social and economic fora, and unilaterally. Canada needs to have and offer ideas, based on Canadians’ ideals, that “make a difference” in world affairs. But, to have a diplomatic voice Canada must pay its dues in the other to domains and by way of a bigger and better foreign service;

2. Aid and development – Canadians pride themselves on “caring and sharing,” even if the balance sheets show that we are far, far less generous than we would like to believe. Aid and development assistant matters, even, perhaps especially when it is poorly managed, allowing large sums to be siphoned off as de facto bribes for government officials. Canada, and other countries in similar positions, can and should expect that aid will be repaid with support for e.g. seats on the UN Security Council; and

3. Security and defence – the most obvious and often most necessary attribute of power is hard, military power. The world (especially the poorest ⅔ of the UN’s members) wants, needs and sometimes even deserves armed help. Canada has been a pioneer and leader in developing and popularizing the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P).³ Canadians have, probably thoughtlessly, agreed that they have a duty to act, with force of arms, to prevent the sorts of human disasters that have been all to prevalent since 1990 – the “high and perhaps rising level of ethnic and nationalist violence” Fukuyama predicted nearly twenty years ago. The current mission in Afghanistan is just one example of Canada actually exercising its R2P. Canadians remember that, under the Taliban, women and girls were denied equal opportunity – or, mostly, any opportunity at all – that soccer stadiums were turned into public execution grounds, and that homosexuals and female adulterers were publicly executed by being buried alive or stoned, respectively. But Afghanistan is not the only or even the neediest country when it comes to R2P. We can confidently predict that the sorts of human crises that caused us to push R2P as a doctrine will occur soon, indeed are occurring right now in Africa. Canada does not have enough military power to go beyond the levels described above – the ones which have already stretched our military too thinly.

But: the world needs some leadership from the middle powers, to offset the fear and mistrust of the USA and the other major powers. And: Canadians want to be leaders. It ought to be a no-brainer; Canada should have been – ever since the mid 1990s – rebuilding its diplomatic brains, its aid and development heart and its military muscle, creating a wise, generous and robust Canadian actor to play our part on the world’s stage. That, despite a generally robust economy, we have not done so, not under prime Minister Chrétien, not under Prime Minister Martin and not under Prime Minister Harper, tells us that political leaders, Liberals and Conservatives alike, have read the polls and have determined that Canadians may ‘want’ to be leaders but they are unwilling to pay the price to actually lead.

And it is no small price. Beyond more than doubling GDP to 0.7% of GDP ($10 Billion/year by about 2010 from about 0.3% today) as we have promised and promised and promised, it will, as The Ruxted Group has explained, ⁴ require something akin to 2.2% of GDP, year after year, for decades, for the defence budget alone. That’s likely to be $30 Billion very soon (Canada’s GDP is at or rapidly approaching $1.5 Trillion)⁵ then $40 Billion by 2020 and perhaps $50 Billion by 2030.   Those are huge numbers: 3% of GDP or $45 Billion (rather than the $25 Billion that most observers predict for 2010 to 2015) to buy ourselves “a role of pride and influence in the world.” We are not surprised that political leaders are unwilling to present such numbers to Canadians.

Canada really is a ‘peaceable kingdom.’ We inherited, from our British forbearers, a distaste for military forces and, especially, for their cost. But: we have roused ourselves when necessary and nations have discovered, to their peril, that they have “made a match with such a wrangler” and have suffered grievously for it. But: we are slow to identify real threats – and not all threats do require an immediate military response, because we would like to believe that others are as peaceable as we. But: we rely too much upon myths:

•   “Our ability and our force and strength are in our moral authority as a peacekeeper;”⁶

•   We don’t need big regular forces because, à la 1812 and 1885, our militia can be mobilized to save the day; and

•   There is no longer any role for a ‘leading middle power.’⁷

A final but: sometimes the threat is real and blue-beret wearing ‘peacekeepers’ and our citizen’s militia will not be enough to meet it. We will need to forge military ties with other powers, great, small and middle and the latter will want and need to be led by someone.

So, therein lies the problem: contrary to the views of most Canadians, The Ruxted Group asserts there are real threats to our peace and prosperity, threats posed by Fukuyama’s ”ethnic and nationalist violence;” these threats require much, much more than a few lightly armed and poorly equipped UN peacekeepers. New, loose alignments of like minded great and middle powers are required to contain and, as necessary, defeat the threats. Canada ought to be a leader amongst the middle powers in this new quest for peace. We have a Responsibility to Protect. Therefore, we need to rouse ourselves and pay the money, up front, now, so that we can pay a lower price in lives and treasure later.   


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1. Fukuyama, Francis: Summer 1989, The National Interest.
2. Marin, Paul: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Foreword from the Prime Minister, Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, 2006, at:  http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-overview2-en.aspx
3. See: http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/cip-pic/responsibilitytoprotect-en.aspx
4. See: Ruxted, A Look to the Future at: http://ruxted.ca/index.php?/archives/73-A-look-to-the-future.html
5. See: Statistics Canada at: http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/indi01b.htm
6. Mohamed Boudjenane, again, at: http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20080314/afghan_protests_080314/20080314?hub=TopStories
7. A myth proffered by e.g. Jennifer Welsh at:  http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/Canada-magazine/issue23/01-title-en.asp

Saving NATO II

A deeply divided NATO held ministerial level meetings recently with a Canadian threat to withdraw from Afghanistan hanging over its head. Prime Minister Harper has, correctly in The Ruxted Group’s estimation, suggested that "NATO's own reputation and future will be in jeopardy"¹ if it cannot get its act together and figure out a way to win in Afghanistan.

In an effort to forestall a NATO failure a panel of distinguished retired military commanders² have reviewed the current situation and have proposed a new grand strategy for a much-reformed NATO and, indeed, the West in a recent paper prepared for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (hereafter “the paper” or “Paper”).

The Ruxted Group accepts the paper’s broad analyses of the challenges ahead and of the grand strategy proposed, but we dispute the paper’s main finding that an enlarged and reformed NATO can or should be the key actor when complex military operations need to be planned, coordinated, mounted and managed on behalf of the United Nations (UN).

The paper’s distinguished authors begin by enumerating six challenges the whole world will face:

1.   Demography - population growth and change across the globe will swiftly change the world we knew;

2.   Climate change - is leading to a new type of politics;

3.   Energy security – the supply and demand of individual nations and the weakening of the international market infrastructure for energy distribution make the situation more precarious than ever;

4.   The rise of the irrational and/or the discounting of the rational - though seemingly abstract, this problem is demonstrated in deeply practical ways. There are soft examples, such as the cult of celebrity, and there are the harder examples, such as the decline of respect for logical argument and evidence, and a drift away from science. The ultimate example is the rise of religious fundamentalism;

5.   The weakening of the nation state - that coincides with the weakening of world institutions, including the UN and regional organisations such as NATO; and

6.   The dark side of globalisation - interconnectedness has its drawbacks. These include internationalised terrorism, organised crime, the rapid spread of disease, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and asymmetric threats from proxy actors or the abuse of financial and energy leverage. Migration continues to provide challenges across the world; globalised threats are wide in scale and unprecedented in complexity.

Source: Paper, pps. 14/15

Taken together, the paper’s authors conclude, and we agree, these challenges mean decades, even generations of conflict which we, the US-led, law-abiding, secular Western democracies, cannot escape. They conclude that there is: a new form of warfare that abuses leverage in finance, energy and information technology. War could be waged without a single bullet being fired, and the implications of this need to become part of strategic and operational thinking. The threats today are a combination of violent terrorism against civilians and institutions, wars fought by proxy by states that sponsor terrorism, the behaviour of rogue states, the actions of organised international crime, and the coordination of hostile action through abuse of non-military means. These dangerous and complex challenges cannot be dealt with by military means alone. The West needs to agree on a new concerted strategy that would include the use of all available instruments, and to prepare for those global and regional challenges that we can predict, as well as those we cannot. Source: Paper, pps. 44/45

The Ruxted Group agrees with most of the analysis but we part company on the “threat” posed by the rise of Asia. We do not believe that it is a zero sum game of Asia vs. the traditional West (which includes e.g. Australia and Japan); rather, we prefer to take a free market perspective and assume that the rising economic, social and political tides in Asia will lift our boats, too. Further, since the challenges we face are global it stands to reason that we need a global response – one that must include friends and traditional allies from the Asia Pacific region.

The Paper moves on to address existing international security capabilities, from a wholly Eurocentric or, at best, North Atlantic perspective, concluding that:

1.   The United Nations remains a vital tool and should play a decisive role, but it is not capable of doing so;

2.   The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is useful in many respects, especially because both Russia and the USA are members. It has a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes among its members, but it lacks a broad vision and a common strategy;

3.   The European Union (EU) is a unique international organisation, partly supranational and partly a confederation. It has brought prosperity to its citizens and has succeeded in maintaining peace and eliminating war among its members. The EU also has political weaknesses, and it lacks unity. In areas of security and geopolitics, there are many internal differences concerning the status of the transatlantic alliance including the relationship with Russia and issues surrounding the Mediterranean and the Middle East; and

4.   The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the most successful political organisation and military alliance in recent history, having managed to settle the Cold War peacefully and on its own terms. Despite its success, NATO faces serious challenges in Afghanistan and has lost the momentum required for transformation of its forces. NATO is, therefore, in danger of losing its credibility. In addition, the organisation seems to need an adequate vision for the future, including an effective strategy. It lacks capabilities, and its constituent nations are showing a marked lack of will for it to prevail. Unreformed, NATO will not be able to meet the challenges it faces now or in the future. NATO’s effectiveness is further constrained by the differences of opinion between the US and Europe, as well as by differences within Europe about the role and use of war, about hard and soft power, and about the legality of armed intervention. European NATO members are also divided among themselves about the size, role and scope of NATO. One important difference among Europeans concerns the range of NATO’s involvement: one view holds that NATO should be focused on Western security and should not extend its competence or its membership worldwide. In this vein, certain members are also opposed to extending NATO membership to non-North Atlantic nations, such as some of the democracies of the Pacific.

Source: Paper, pps. 71/75

The currently vexing problems of national caveats and sharing of intelligence are well-presented in the paper; it is hard to form a team-approach when each player, for national political reasons, applies different caveats to its forces and relies upon different intelligence estimates. Part of this problem is created by the very size of NATO which, later, the authors propose to enlarge. NATO, like the EU, is, simply, too big, too divided and too political to bring forward a tight, cohesive plan for the sorts of complex military operations that will confront us in the future.
 
The paper concludes that there is a serious shortfall between the threats facing the world, not just the West, and the existing capabilities of e.g. the UN and NATO.

The authors posit (p. 85) that all is not lost because, and here we agree: “What we do have, however, are common aims, values and interests, and these alone provide a sufficient basis on which to design a new global strategy – one that appreciates the complexity and unpredictability, and that links all the instruments and capabilities together. Looking at the scale of trends, challenges and threats, we cannot see a solution in America, Europe, or any individual nation acting alone. What we need is a transatlantic alliance capable of implementing a comprehensive grand strategy that is integrated, both nationally and among allies.”

Ruxted takes great issue with one word of this assessment. The authors should have said and the leaders of the secular, law abiding democracies must insist that “what we need to is a global alliance capable of implementing a comprehensive grand strategy,” etc.

The central issue, the one the paper’s authors got right, is that the problems and challenges are global – they are not, in the main, in and around Europe and the North Atlantic. The ‘cockpit’ is, now, as it has been so often in history, in West and Central Asia and it is likely to shift towards Africa sooner rather than later. It is highly unlikely that Eurocentric or, at best, North Atlantic solutions are going to work all that well.

The Ruxted Group agrees with the paper’s broad thrust. The proposed new grand-strategy aims to preserve peace, values, free trade and stability. It seeks as much certainty as possible for the member nations, the resolution of crises by peaceful means and the prevention of armed conflict. In doing so, it aims to reduce the reasons for conflict and – should all attempts to find peaceful solutions fail – to defend the member states’ territorial integrity and protect their citizens’ way of life, including their values and convictions. Source: p. 92

The authors propose (Paper, p. 106) a clear, simple and, in our view, workable grand-strategy. But, despite the paper’s many, many excellent analyses and deductions the authors end up making the wrong conclusion because about implementing that strategy because, we think, of their highly Eurocentric views. NATO, even an expanded alliance,³ cannot meet the objectives the UN will set because NATO will still be centred on the divided and divisive Europe.

The paper correctly points out that the problems facing us are global in nature but the paper then proposes only a ‘North Atlantic’ solution. Ruxted repeats: that is not going to be good enough. NATO should be maintained, enlarged and reformed but it needs to be steered, in the purely military sphere, by a small, nimble, global alignment (rather than a formal alliance) of internationally respected (hopefully trusted), secular, law abiding democracies that have similar (even shared) intelligence systems and military standards. The Ruxted Group has proposed in the past and continues to suggest that this alignment must include the USA (for credibility) and should also include trusted members from the Americas (Canada), Europe (the United Kingdom) and the Asia-Pacific region (Australia, New Zealand and Singapore). Other qualified nations will be associated with the group; countries like Chile, Denmark, India, Japan, the Netherlands and Norway might be amongst them.

The world, connected or not, is dangerous and is growing more so. Existing international institutions (the UN, NATO, etc) are ill-suited to protect the world from itself. All can and should be reformed but a new global alignment of traditionally law biding, secular democracies is required to lead reformed regional groups, like NATO, in creating and managing the five-point strategy outlined above to serve our own and the UN’s interests – such leadership is especially necessary when ‘enforcement’ is the order of the day.

Canada needs to have its voice heard in the world. Canadians want to contribute, actively, to the quest for world peace and security and they want their ‘values’ to animate any grand strategy which might involve Canada. Therefore, Canada should whine less and work assiduously, albeit quietly, to save NATO from itself and, more importantly, to create a new ‘alignment’ of like-minded, respected democracies which we can join with confidence and pride.


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1. See: http://www.nationalpost.com/story.html?id=290006
2. General (ret.) Dr. Klaus Naumann, KBE Former Chief of the Defence Staff, Germany and Former Chairman of NATO’s  Military Committee; General (ret.) John Shalikashvili Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States of America and Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe; Field Marshal The Lord Inge, KG, GCB, PC Former Chief of the Defence Staff of the United Kingdom; Admiral (ret.) Jacques Lanxade Former Chief of the Defence Staff of France and Former Ambassador; and General (ret.) Henk van den Breemen Former Chief of the Defence Staff of the Netherlands
3. See ‘Enlargement and the three circles’ pps. 132/136 of the paper

Saving NATO?

The Ruxted Group believes that the Report of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (hereafter the Manley Report or just the Report) makes two vital points:

First (as we said just a few days ago): Prime Minister Harper must convince Canadians that this mission, which the Manley Report describes as “honourable and achievable” is, indeed, worth the blood and treasure Canadians have paid and that it is worth more of both; and

Second: this is the first major test of NATO’s utility in the 21st century.

About 13 months ago we said, “for a half century and more, NATO was the cornerstone of our foreign and defence policies,” but, now, “NATO is less and less a useful 'cornerstone' for Canada and, more and more, a stumbling block.”

The question we posed then was: is saving NATO worthwhile? We answered it, to our satisfaction, with a qualified “yes.” Our main qualification was and remains that the UN needs a new military “agent” to plan, coordinate, mount and manage complex operations. We believe that agency should a small, nimble, global (not just North Atlantic) alignment of like-minded nations; not a formal alliance with all the bureaucracy and politics that implies. We propose Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore and the USA as the core group with countries like Denmark, India, the Netherlands and Norway closely affiliated. Most of the core members are already united in various military standardization groups – some of which already “lead” NATO in those efforts.

The Manley Report’s conclusions may have put the task of “saving NATO” in Prime Minister Harper’s hands. He appears to have accepted the Report’s recommendation that we should “stay the course” only if another NATO nation deploys a battle group to augment the active combat force in Kandahar.

We believe it is fair to say that most countries from Ruxted`s core group are relatively ‘committed’ to this UN sanctioned NATO mission while most European members of NATO (Denmark and the Netherlands excepted) are, relatively, ‘disengaged’ either in terms of the numbers of troops committed or, in the cases of France and Germany, for example, by the number and nature of the caveats imposed on their forces. NATO says it is determined to find the 1,000 additional troops for Southern Afghanistan, but Canadians need to take NATO’s assurances with a grain of salt because this is not the first time NATO has been determined to increase ISAF combat forces in the South.

In political terms, some European NATO nations have already run for cover by authorizing a peacekeeping mission of sorts in Chad. This is understandable; many, probably most, European governments are unconvinced that the US-dominated ISAF mission is “right” for them. This is, roughly, the same position Canada took (albeit relative to joining the US led coalition in Iraq) when it joined ISAF.

We must remember that NATO invoked Article V (an attack on one is an attack on all) for the very first time on 12 Sep 01. There was a broad, general rush of support for the USA in September 2001. Canada, almost immediately - in October 2001, sent naval units (HMC Ships Charlottetown, Halifax, Iroquois and Preserver) to the Persian Gulf with specific orders to join in the “war on terror.” In the autumn of that year Canada offered a battle group (3 PPCLI Battle Group deployed to Kandahar in early 2002) to fight alongside our American friends. Opinions, in Canada and most of Europe, changed rapidly with the invasion of Iraq. Support for the USA faded because many countries could not understand that strategic rationale for President Bush’s actions. Afghanistan and Iraq got mixed together in the public mind – and the polling Ruxted has seen indicates that confusion exists today – and support for the UN-sanctioned (we should say UN begged for) mission in Afghanistan also faded.

Most respectable security/defence and foreign policy analysts seem to agree with the Manley Report that:

1.   The mission in Afghanistan, while difficult, is “just” and important for the West;

2.   The campaign in Afghanistan can be “won” if two things happen –

a.   We get the aim (the victory conditions, as Ruxted described them) right, and

b.   We get enough troops on the ground, in the right place – in the South, especially in Kandahar; and

3.   NATO will, quite likely, be a useless shell if it cannot manage to win in Afghanistan.

The question, for Prime Minister Harper is not, we suggest, whether to save NATO but, rather, how.

Perhaps the threat of an institutional failure will be sufficient to convince some NATO members to offer more troops. But the threat of a NATO failure may be cushioned by the “promise” of a new, robust EuroForce of some sort. Some NATO nations might be only too happy to see less and less North American influence in world affairs and those nations might be willing to make promises about a strong, influential, united Europe. In Ruxted’s view: it is highly unlikely that the European members of NATO (excepting the UK from that category) can or will be persuaded to strengthen their forces in Afghanistan. That leaves two choices –

1.   Persuading other non-European ISAF members, to increase their contributions – perhaps Australia and New Zealand, Turkey, the UK or the USA could be targeted for political pressure; or

2.   Recruiting (a) new member(s) for ISAF; China and India are obvious choices, but so are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia and South Africa.

In our view, the best immediate term course open is to ask the USA to make at least part of the recently announced “surge” both permanent and part of NATO’s response to Canada’s justified “demand” for help in Kandahar. Another good long term course is to ask Australia and New Zealand to form a combined battle group, based on their existing contribution but to move from Bamiyan and Uruzgan provinces to Kandahar. That course would improve matters in Kandahar but it would not add many new troops to ISAF.

It is likely that NATO’s reaction to Canada’s pending demand will signal the future of the alliance. If members (American and European, alike) want NATO to survive then some nations will offer new forces. If they fail to do so and if Canada cannot persuade other, non-NATO friends to take up the burden then NATO will, rightfully, be seen as a “paper tiger” and its utility, as the UN’s “military agent” will be reduced and the alliance itself may wither and die from lack of a useful role in the world.
 
No matter what NATO and others decide, Canada must continue to rebuild its military capabilities so that we will be able to respond when our much-hyped “Responsibility to Protect” requires it. We must, simultaneously, work diplomatically to create a new, better, global alignment of like-minded nations to help plan, coordinate, mount and manage the sorts of military operations the United Nations is certain to want us to undertake in the coming years.
 
The Ruxted Group believes that Prime Minister Harper and Canadian ministers and officials must all press hard, at forthcoming NATO meetings – in an effort to save Afghanistan and NATO, itself.

The Manley Report

The Report of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (hereafter the Manley Report or just the Report) has been published, and Ruxted is, generally, pleased with the results.  In particular, we are happy to see endorsement of our recent message that combat is necessary in Afghanistan¹ and we agree that more soldiers are definitely required.

With one possible small exception, Ruxted fully supports the five recommendations on pages 37 and 38.  Our concern is that some may see a binding obligation in the comment that Canada should “secure medium helicopter lift capacity and high-performance unmanned Aerial Vehicles … before February 2009.” This is an excellent recommendation, and we take comfort that the report says “should” as opposed to “must.”  As long as these equipments do not become a prerequisite for remaining in Afghanistan, then Ruxted will give its support to this recommendation.

We were also very pleased to see the call for another nation to provide a battle group to join our forces in Kandahar.  The whole ISAF mission is plagued by a lack of troops, and there was an unhelpful naivety in previous opposition recommendations that Canadian forces leave whether they are replaced or not.  In an area comparable in size to New Brunswick the presence of a much larger two-nation task force will go a long way to improving security and the safety of all persons, military and civilian, in Kandahar.  Ruxted hopes that the invitation of come join us in Kandahar is better received by NATO allies than the invitation of come replace us in Kandahar.

While the Manley Report completely knocked the intellectual and moral props out from under Gilles Duceppe, Stéphane Dion and Jack Layton, it does little to address Stephen Harper’s main problem.  It fails to provide him with a simple “make it go away” strategy that would appeal to the solid majority of Canadians who, in this case, believes “doing the right thing” is just too difficult and too expensive. That aside, there are, perhaps, two points from the recently released Manley Report that matter most:

First: The blood of hundreds of Canadians, dead and wounded, mostly young men and women who are, simultaneously ordinary, as the NDP loves to define ‘ordinary Canadians,’ and extraordinary, in bravery and commitment, has earned us a place of honour in the councils of nations, a place we abandoned in 1970 with then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s misbegotten foreign policy, published in that year; and

Second: It is now, clearly and as agreed by the leaders of Her Majesty's Official Loyal Opposition, the duty of Prime Minister Stephen Harper to tell Canadians why we are there – something he has, thus far, failed to do. We would prefer to think that this failure results from Prime Minister Harper being unable to get the message out through the static. In the absence of a clear message other alternatives are allowed to present themselves.  Unpleasant alternatives, such as being afraid to alienate voters, or being genuinely unable to grasp the complexities of fighting a modern counter-insurgency, are preferable to the most heinous of all: that he is using the mission and the soldiers as props in a small, partisan, domestic political squabble.  It is imperative that the Prime Minister present his message clearly and that he be permitted to present his message fairly by the opposition parties.  Whatever the reasons for the confusion in the minds of Canadians, the blood which has earned us a higher place in the world is also on his hands, as it is on the hands of all of us who support or previously supported this mission. Canadians need to know, need to be convinced, that he (and his predecessors) sent young Canadians to be maimed and killed for something greater than a short term political advantage.

Shortly after taking office Prime Minister Harper demonstrated that he understood one of the reasons Canadians are fighting and dying in Afghanistan: to burnish our badly tarnished leadership credentials. He said, in a 5 July 2006 speech, that one (but only one) of the reasons Canadians are fighting and dying in Afghanistan is  “that is the price of leadership in the world," and “It is also the price of moving the world forward."

Some might have thought the comment calculating, even cold, but Prime Minister Harper understood then that the only reason we maintain a tough, superbly disciplined professional army is to protect and promote our vital interests in the world, including here in Canada.

Improving our international leadership position is one of our vital interests: enhancing our reputation in global security matters pays dividends in trade and commerce, too. “Moving the world forward” is a domestic vital interest – the “world” of 2000 was unstable and the failed state of Afghanistan provided al Qaeda with a firm base from which it could manage dastardly attacks on New York and Washington D.C. Helping the people of Afghanistan to rebuild a nation-state that is strong enough to avoid failing and falling into the grasp of terrorists is “moving the world forward” and it is one of Canada’s vital interests.

Therefore: We are in Afghanistan in order to protect and promote our vital interests, Canadian interests. Happily they are also the world’s interests as UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon explained when, in a recent Globe and Mail article, he too knocked the stuffing out of the Duceppe/Dion/Layton positions. Our interests also coincide with the interests of the Afghan people and their lawfully elected government. We are fighting a counterinsurgency campaign and “winning hearts and minds” is still the sine qua non of victory in such campaigns. Everything we do to win hearts and minds helps the legitimate government of Afghanistan to extend its reach and helps the ‘ordinary Afghans’ (the ones we would like to hope are in the thoughts and prayers of Jack Layton and the NDP) resist the Taliban terror.

The Manley Report said that, “Canadian objectives in Afghanistan are both honourable and achievable.”  The panel members went on to say that, “The aim there is not to create some fanciful model of prosperous democracy. Canadian objectives are more realistic: to contribute, with others, to a better governed, stable and developing Afghanistan whose government can protect the security of the country and its people.” (Report, p. 33) This is very close to what Ruxted has been saying² for more than a year. To get there – to those honourable and achievable objectives - we must continue to fight the good fight and finish the assignment, even if, as several very senior military officers have suggested, it is the work of a generation.

It is true that many Canadians may object to any military mission which does not serve an immediate humanitarian purpose, but Ruxted would remind these Canadians that there is such a purpose.  The war in Afghanistan has at least the same moral integrity as traditional UN peacekeeping as our soldiers are fighting for the same peace, security, civil-safety and humanitarian standards.  We continue to hope that the Prime Minister will state in no uncertain terms that turning our back on the Afghan people would be hypocritical of a nation that self-indulges in a vision of itself as a peacekeeper.  Canadians must come to accept this because the reality is that peacekeeping has forever changed.

The Report stated that Afghanistan “is not the same UN peacekeeping that Canadians have known and supported ... there is not yet a peace to keep, no truce to supervise or “green line” to watch. This is a peace-enforcement operation, as provided for under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It is a collective use of force, under international law, to address a threat to international peace and security posed by continuing disorder in Afghanistan. It reflects as well the changing nature of UN mandated peace missions, which have become more robust in the use of force to protect civilians since the harsh lessons learned in the murderous disasters of Bosnia and Rwanda. Similar ... missions have served in Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo ... these are the kinds of force the UN might be called upon to apply more often in future, where the human rights and human security of ordinary people are threatened. When the UN and its members authorize such a mission, Canadians have a choice: Canada can participate ... or we can leave the mission to others.” (Report, p. 21) This puts paid to the simplistic “let’s go back to traditional UN peacekeeping” nonsense put about by ill informed, anti-military academics, busybodies and commentators.

Canadian economist Robert Calderisi said³ “As international terrorists search for alternative safe havens, as new diseases like SARS and avian flu spread beyond their countries of origin, and as mass human migration begins to rival nuclear proliferation as the dominant challenge in the early twenty-first century there will be rising interest in ... containing the international ripple effects of failed states. Most of those states are in Africa.” The next time, and the many times after that the UN asks NATO and a few others to organize and manage “peace-enforcement operations” they will likely be in Africa. Canada will participate. Canadians will kill and die. Other Canadians will weep and still others wail but there is no alternative – not if we have any worthwhile values at all.

The Manley Report has provided an elegantly simple, tightly reasoned and ultimately persuasive analysis of the state of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan and the Report makes useful and sensible recommendations for the future of that mission. The onus is, now, on Prime Minister Harper to make the mission his own and to bring Canadians onside with him. There is, equally, an opportunity for M. Stéphane Dion to encourage the Canadians he aspires to lead in our vital task of “moving the world forward.”


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1. See: http://ruxted.ca/index.php?/archives/104-No-Security-Without-Combat.html
2. See: http://ruxted.ca/index.php?/archives/24-The-Afghanistan-Debate.html et seq
3. Calderisi, Robert, The Trouble with Africa, New York, 2006, p. 2

No Security Without Combat

The debate on Canada's role in Afghanistan rages on.  Ruxted would be prepared to accept arguments that Canada needs to wind down its battle group between November 2009 and August 2010 in order to ensure forces are available for the February Olympics. So far, we have not heard that.  Sadly, it still seems the debate revolves around fantastic misconceptions about the provision of security and the reality of the threat in Afghanistan.

"The military forces of Canada have a role to play after February 2009 — even though it's not combat, it will be for security," Dion told reporters Sunday the 13th of January 2008.  Ruxted finds this position particularly worrisome as it suggests a continued naivety despite Mr. Dion's visit to Afghanistan.  Even the classical peacekeeping, of which Canadians take as a source of pride, required Canadian troops to engage in combat in places such as Cyprus and Bosnia.  Combat aversion is the sort of half-measure that was responsible for the atrocity of Rwanda.

Fortunately, Mr Dion may be on to the right idea but it is not what he thinks.  Three days after his first comment, Mr.Dion observed, "The war against terrorism is mainly a police matter."  Here in Canada, people would not accept if police only arrested criminals that they caught in the act.  There is an expectation that, in the provision of public security, the police will conduct investigations and go after the "evil doers."  At the same time, police have tactical units capable of responding to the armed and aggressive threat.  So, how do we provide security in Afghanistan without doing the same?

Here in Canada, organized crime does not make a business of hunting the police but in Afghanistan that is what the threat does.  In Canada, organized crime does not attempt to seize political control (even local control of municipalities) by armed force but the threat in Afghanistan does.  In Afghanistan, the armed and aggressive threat is insurgent militias.  In this environment, the “typical police patrol car” might look like an infantry platoon and the emergency response team may resemble a combat team or special forces.

The combat mission is essential to the success of Afghanistan.  In its absence, everything else is only a half measure.